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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, ] 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, ] 
vs. ] 
RAMON BELTRAN, ] 
Defendant / Appellant. ] 
) BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
) Case No. 980087-CA 
) Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for battery, a Class B 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code §11.08.020. The Utah Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues for Review. 
(I) Did the trial court commit error by denying Mr. Beltran defense of habitation as an 
affirmative defense on the facts presented at trial? 
(II) Did the trial court commit error by finding Mr. Beltran guilty considering the evidence 
presented and the affirmative defense of self-defense? 
Standard of Review. 
The defendant has stated the standard of review for both issues in terms of the law/fact 
dichotomy. That is, that a trial court's conclusions of law are accorded no deference by the 
reviewing court, citing State v. Deli. 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1991); while the trial court's factual 
finding regarding the sufficiency of the evidence in a bench trial is reviewed under the "clearly 
erroneous" standard, citing State v. Walker. 743 P.2d 191 (Utah 1987), under which the trial 
court's determination will be set aside if against the weight of the evidence. However, the 
standard of review in this case is not as simple as application of the "wooden rule" of the law/fact 
dichotomy. Indeed, we may find ourselves roaming the pasture of discretion. 
Issue I questions whether the trial judge erred in his determination that the defense of 
habitation was unavailable. In his argument, the defendant characterizes that issue as an 
erroneous interpretation of the statute which poses a question of law. With regard to questions of 
law, such as matters of statutory construction, trial courts are given little discretion and the issue 
is reviewed for "correctness." State v. Heaton. 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (Utah 1998); State v. 
Petersen. 810 P.2d 421 (Utah 1991). However, the determination that the defense was 
unavailable was also necessarily fact based. That is, there are certain factual predicates upon 
which the availability of the defense of habitation rests. As to these factual determinations trial 
courts are given much greater discretion or deference, and the issue is reviewed under the "clearly 
erroneous" standard. Where a trial court makes a determination on contested facts, the appellate 
court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's determination. State v. 
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); State v. Gardiner. 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991). Therefore, the 
whole of the issue—where the trial court makes a legal determination based on findings of fact— 
presents a mixed question of law and fact with the trial court applying the law to the facts. This 
application of the law to the facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Pena. 869 P.2d 932 
(Utah 1994). In cases of mixed questions of law and fact, where the trial court makes a 
determination on contested facts, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial 
court's determination, the appellate court reverses only if the necessary factual findings implicit in 
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the court's determination lack sufficient evidentiary support. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 
(Utah 1991). 
Issue II questions the sufficiency of the evidence given the facts presented by the 
prosecution and the self-defense theory raised by the defendant. However, in his argument the 
defendant asserts that the trial judge erred in denying him the statutory defense of self-defense, 
again based on the trial court's application of facts to the law. To the extent that this assertion 
raises a mixed question of law and fact, the discussion above applies. With regard to the 
sufficiency of the evidence, a finding resulting from a bench trial will be reversed only if, after the 
defendant has marshaled all available and relevant evidence, the finding appears to be clearly 
erroneous. Bell v. Elder. 782 P.2d 545 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Further, in considering findings of 
fact on a claim of insufficient evidence, the court is mindful of the trial court's advantaged 
position in hearing the testimony firsthand. The marshaling requirement means that the defendant 
must marshal all the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then demonstrate that 
even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings. State v. Moore. 802 P.2d 732 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The marshaling 
requirement has been applied to criminal bench trials. State v. Moosmaa 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 
1990). In Moore the court cautioned that simply urging the same points raised at trial is not 
enough. 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-402 (1953 as amended) [Force in defense of person - Forcible 
felony defined.] states in pertinent part: 
(1) A person is justified in threatening or using force against another when and to the 
extent that he or she reasonably believes that force is necessary to defend himself or a 
third person against such other's imminent use of unlawful force . . . . 
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(2) A person is not justified in using force under the circumstances specified in 
Subsection (1) if he or she:... 
(c) (i) was the aggressor or was engaged in a combat by agreement.... 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-2-405 (1953 as amended) [Force in defense of habitation.] states in 
pertinent part: 
(1) A person is justified in using force against another when and to the extent that he 
reasonably believes that the force is necessary to prevent or terminate the other's unlawful 
entry into or attack upon his habitation.... 
(2) The person using force or deadly force in defense of habitation is presumed.. .to have 
acted reasonably and had a reasonable fear of imminent peril of death or serious bodily 
injury if the entry or attempted entry is unlawful and is made or attempted by use offeree, 
or in a violent or tumultuous manner, or surreptitiously or by stealth, or for the purpose of 
committing a felony. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Ramon Beltran, was charged by Information with having committed the 
offense of Battery on September 29, 1996, in violation of § 11.08.020 of the Salt Lake City 
Code. On October 16, 1996, the defendant appeared at an arraignment and entered a plea of not 
guilty to the charge. Following entry of the plea, a number of pretrial conference hearings were 
conducted. A number of bench trial settings were placed on the calendar, each one continued for 
one reason or another. This matter was finally heard at a bench trial on October 14, 1997. The 
defendant was convicted of Battery, a Class B misdemeanor, in violation of Salt Lake City Code 
§ 11.08.020, the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, presiding. Sentencing was set on January 6, 1998, 
and this appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 29, 1996, Ramon Beltran (defendant) was at home with most of his family 
and several guests when his son Heratio arrived. Heratio was accompanied by his wife and a 
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friend, the victim in this case, Luis Cardenas. R. 69 at 11-12. The defendant lived in one unit of a 
duplex that he owned and Heratio and his wife had been living in the other unit of the duplex. R. 
69 at 135. Although Heratio had paid some rent in the past on the unit of the duplex in which he 
and his wife lived, he had not done so in recent months and the defendant had recently asked them 
to leave. R. 69 at 91. Heratio and his wife were in the process of moving out of the unit of the 
duplex in which they had lived and had returned that day to remove some of their belongings. 
There had been some sharp feelings in the recent past between the defendant and Heratio, so his 
arrival was not under the best of circumstances. In fact, there had been a confrontation just the 
day before the incident involved in this case. 
Heratio and his wife left the vehicle in front of the duplex and walked down the driveway 
to the patio in the back of the duplex. Cardenas waited in the vehicle. R. 69 at 12-13. Heratio 
arrived at the patio area and entered the kitchen door of the unit of the duplex in which he and his 
wife had been living and in which much of their personal belongings were located. R. 69 at 61, 
91-94, 135-140. Almost immediately the defendant, who was in the patio or garage area, rushed 
to the kitchen where Heratio had entered and confronted him about his presence. R. 69 at 62, 84, 
116. Heated words were exchanged between father and son. Within moments the two men 
spilled out into the patio area struggling with each other, disturbing the defendant's guests. As 
they were wrestling, Heratio's wife attempted to pull the defendant away from Heratio. One of 
the defendant's guests then intervened and started choking Heratio. R. 69 at 17-20, 145. Seeing 
this, Heratio's wife ran to the front of the duplex calling for Cardenas, who was also her brother, 
to help. R. 69 at 14, 145. During all of this struggling, Cardenas arrived on the scene. 
Cardenas testified that when he arrived in the patio area he saw the defendant hitting or 
kicking Heratio while Heratio was on the ground purple in the face from being choked by one of 
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the defendant's guests. R. 69 at 20. Cardenas rushed to the group and pulled the guest who was 
choking Heratio off of him, whereupon Heratio and the defendant got up. R. 69 at 20-21. After 
they got up, the two men continued to struggle with one another. Cardenas attempted to separate 
the combatants and stop the fight. R. 69 at 24, 45. The stipulated testimony of Heratio's wife 
also supports Cardenas' testimony. R. 69 at 145. The defendant then picked up a stool and came 
at Cardenas and he defensively pushed the defendant away with his right hand. R. 69 at 23-26, 
46-47, 145. During this effort, the index finger on his right hand entered the defendant's mouth. 
R. 69 at 25-26. The defendant bit down on Cardenas' finger with such force that the tip of the 
finger was completely severed. R. 69 at 27 Cardenas ran from the area screaming and Heratio 
followed. Cardenas was taken to the hospital and underwent substantial medical treatment for the 
injury. 
The defendant was charged for the battery upon Cardenas. Eventually the defendant 
requested a bench trial in which he asserted claims of self-defense, defense of habitation and 
defense of property. The trial judge, acting as fact finder, determined that the defendant was the 
primary aggressor in the affray and, therefore, the self-defense theory was unavailable; and that 
under the facts, the theories of defense of habitation and defense of property were unavailable. 
The defendant was found guilty of battery in violation of Salt Lake City Code §11.08.020 and 
sentenced appropriately. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court heard contested evidence concerning the applicability of the affirmative 
defenses of defense of habitation and self-defense. Based upon hearting that evidence firsthand, 
and evaluating witness credibility, the trial court found that the defendant did not use force to 
prevent or terminate an unlawful or violent or tumultuous entry into or attack upon his habitation. 
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Having found that this factual predicate to the application of defense of habitation was lacking, 
the trial court correctly determined and ruled that this affirmative defense was not available to the 
defendant. This determination was based upon the findings of fact made by the trial court applied 
to the plain language of the statute. The trial court did not engage in statutory construction, but 
rather, simply applied the facts of the case to the requirements of the statute. 
Also based upon hearing the evidence firsthand and evaluating witness credibility, the trial 
court found that the defendant was the aggressor in the affray involved in this case. Having found 
that the defendant was the aggressor, the trial court correctly determined and ruled that seld-
defense was not available to the defendant. Again, the trial court simply applied the facts of the 
case to the requirements of the statute. 
Having found that neither of the claimed affirmative defenses were available to the 
defendant under the facts of the case, the trial court correctly found that the evidence was 
sufficient to support the finding of guilt. Therefore, the conviction of the defendant for Battery, in 
violation of § 11.08.020 of the Salt Lake City Code, should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
BASED ON THE FINDINGS OF FACT MADE IN THE CASE, THE 
TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT DEFENSE OF 
HABITATION WAS NOT AVAILABLE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE IN THIS CASE. 
The right to defend one's home against an unlawful and violent entry or attack has existed 
as a right of survival throughout civilized history. However, that right, as permitted under our 
law, has some important predicates before it can be justified. First, the person resorting to 
defense of habitation must "reasonably" believe that force is necessary; and second, the force must 
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be necessary to prevent or terminate "an unlawful entry into or attack upon his habitation." A 
person who has resorted to defense of habitation benefits from a favorable presumption under the 
statute that his conduct was reasonable if the entry or attempted entry is "unlawful and is made or 
attempted by use of force, or in a violent or tumultuous manner." Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-405 
(1953 as amended). 
The term "habitation" is generally defined as a place of abode, dwelling or residence. 
Black's Law Dictionary (6th Ed., 1991). While a house may not be a home, it is axiomatic that a 
habitation involves some form of structure within which one resides. 
In State v. Duran. 772 P.2d 982 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), the court clarified that in self-
defense or defense of habitation cases where the person relying upon the defenses claims to 
"reasonably" believe that force in defense of self or habitation is necessary, that "reasonably" 
means objectively reasonable. Fear based on prior violence or a violent environment is not 
enough to evidence reasonable fear. State v. Maestas, 564 P.2d 1386 (Utahl977). 
In State v. Mitcheson. 560 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1977), the court expressed the public policy 
purpose of the statutory provision permitting defense of habitation as "preserving the peace and 
good order of society." In State v. McKenna. 728 P.2d 984 (Utah 1986), the court stated that the 
purpose of the statute was "to protect and preserve the privacy and peace of one's home." 
Central to both cases was the question—Who's home is it anyway? In Mitcheson the concept of 
habitation was expanded to include a sister's home in which the defendant in that case was a 
guest; in McKenna the court clarified that the home must be the habitation, as the term was 
defined, of the person claiming the defense, not someone else's. In McKenna the court 
determined that although the defendant in that case had been a guest in his ex-wife's home at 
various times, the residence was not his habitation at the time in question. In the present case, 
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the property rights bundle of sticks is not so neatly tied that either the defendant or Heratio can be 
easily excluded from claiming the residence were the altercation first began as their habitation. 
However, what is clear is that the main part of the entire sorry episode, including all of the time in 
which Cardenas was involved, occurred on an outside patio rather than inside a dwelling or 
residence. 
So, who's "habitation" was it? Although the defendant owned the duplex, Heratio and his 
wife lived in one unit of the duplex and for some period of time paid some rent. It was to this unit 
that Heratio and his wife had returned to remove some of their belongings. The defendant 
testified that he considered it still to be Heratio's home, to which he could return - but not to 
make trouble. R. 69 at 139-140. The defendant's wife also testified that the unit to which 
Heratio returned was his home and that he had a right to be there. R. 69 at 91-92. Given the 
nature of the duplex, it would seem that the patio was a common area adjacent to both units in the 
duplex, and Heratio would, therefore, have a right to be there also. 
In his argument, the defendant alleges that the trial court make two errors in the 
application of the defense of habitation. First, the defendant alleges that the trial court discounted 
the importance of the location of the altercation. The defendant notes the trial court's statement 
that "This is a fight that happened to take place on Mr. Beltran's property." R. 69 at 179. The 
defendant asserts that this statement implies that the trial court determined this to be an irrelevant 
fact. Not so. Rather, this statement demonstrates the trial court's reasoning that under the facts 
the defendant was not engaged in the use of force to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry into 
or attack upon his habitation. Under the facts as found and applied by the trial court, neither 
Heratio nor Cardenas made an unlawful entry into the defendant's habitation. The defendant and 
his wife testified that they considered the unit of the duplex in which Heratio had been residing as 
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his home to which he had a right to return. R. 69 at 91-92, 139-140. Heratio had returned and 
Cardenas was, in effect, the guest of Heratio at a place where Heratio had a right to be. In any 
event, Cardenas never entered into either of the places of abode or dwellings present and part of 
the duplex. While the fight took place on the defendant's property—the patio area of the 
duplex—it did not take place as a result of an unlawful entry into or attack upon the defendant's 
dwelling or place of abode. 
The second error the defendant alleges that the trial court made in the application of the 
defense of habitation was requiring a "property under attack" qualifier. The defendant 
misconstrues the trial court. It is clear from the context of the record that the trial court was 
using the word "property" as a synonym for habitation or residence. The defendant takes words 
out of context to argue that the trial court somehow required that the fight be for control or 
possession of the habitation (property). Read as a whole, the record shows that the trial court 
was reasoning that the force used by the defendant was not to prevent or terminate an unlawful 
entry into or attack upon his habitation, as required by the statute. Therefore, the trial court 
found that, under the facts of the case, defense of habitation was not an available defense against 
the charge of battery against Cardenas. Ergo, if defense of habitation is not available, defendant 
never benefits from the presumption in paragraph (2) of U.C.A. § 76-2-405. 
The trial court did not construe the defense of habitation statute erroneously; rather, the 
trial court heard contested evidence, made factual findings, applied them to the statute and found 
that the defense was not available. The factual findings made by the trial court are entitled to 
deference, since under Pena the trial court has greater discretion (larger pasture in which to roam) 
regarding these kinds of decisions, and are reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. The 
application of those factual findings to the law are entitled to a great deal of deference, since 
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under Pena in these areas the trial court has great discretion (an even larger pasture in which to 
roam) regarding these kinds of decisions and are reviewed under the "abuse of discretion" 
standard. Based on the factual findings the trial court made, the defense of habitation defense 
was not available to the defendant, and the ruling of the trial court should be affirmed. 
POINT 2. 
BASED ON ITS FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS THE 
AGGRESSOR, THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DETERMINED 
THAT SELF-DEFENSE WAS NOT AVAILABLE AS AN AFFIRMATIVE 
DEFENSE IN THIS CASE AND THAT THE EVIDENCE WAS 
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT THE FINDING OF GUILT. 
In his argument, the defendant submits that biting off Cardenas' fingertip was justified 
under a theory of self-defense. The defendant sets out the trial court's ruling that the defendant 
was the aggressor, especially with regard to Cardenas, and argues that the trial court somehow 
required the defendant to prove self-defense. R. 69 at 180-181. The defendant misconstrues the 
trial court's ruling. 
The trial court, on contested evidence, had the following facts to support its finding. 
Heratio had returned to a place where he had a right to be and had entered therein peaceably. R. 
69 at 61, 91-94, 135-140. The defendant then rushed to where Heratio was and began the 
confrontation which then led to the initial fight. R. 69 at 62, 84, 116. Cardenas, present as 
Heratio's guest, was waiting off the property in the vehicle in which they had arrived. R. 69 at 
11-12. The fight progressed to the point where Heratio was being struck by the defendant and 
choked by one of the defendant's guests. R. 69 at 17-20, 145. Heratio's wife then summoned 
Cardenas. R. 69 at 14, 145. Cardenas enters the patio area, pulls the guest choking Heratio away 
from Heratio and thereafter manages to gain some separation between Heratio and the defendant. 
R. 69 at 20-24, 45, 145. At this point there is a substantial break that presented itself as the last 
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clear chance for all parties to walk away before the injury to Cardenas. Rather than avail himself 
of that opportunity, the defendant continued his aggression. There is testimony that the defendant 
picked up a stool and while approaching Cardenas, who was between the defendant and Heratio, 
began swinging the stool at Cardenas. R. 69 at 23-26, 46-47, 145. As Cardenas then defensively 
pushed the defendant away with his right hand, his finger entered the mouth of the defendant and 
the defendant bit Cardenas' finger severing the fingertip. R. 69 at 25-27, 145. 
While the defendant, drawing on generalized out of context statements that Cardenas tried 
to help Heratio, argues that Cardenas could not have been present as a peacemaker. Perhaps the 
term peacemaker is too strong, but what is clear is that Cardenas was present in an effort to stop 
the fight—not win it. The defendant then argues that no other witness supports Cardenas' 
testimony that the defendant picked up and swung a stool at him. Indeed, the stipulated testimony 
of Heratio's wife was that she saw the defendant pick up a stool and awing it, she thought, at 
Heratio. R. 69 at 145. The trial judge, having the opportunity to hear the testimony firsthand and 
weigh the credibility of the witnesses, and acknowledging that the evidence was contested, 
believed the testimony of Cardenas as corroborated by Heratio's wife. The facts expressed above 
clearly support the trial court's finding that the defendant was the initial aggressor and continued 
to be the primary aggressor thereafter. Based upon its finding, the trial court then correctly 
applied the self-defense statute, which in paragraph (2)(c)(i) of U.C.A. § 76-2-402, denies the 
defense to the aggressor. Under Pena, the trial court has a larger pasture in which to roam in such 
determinations and its finding is entitled to deference and reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" 
standard. The trial court's application of the facts to the statute is entitled to even more deference 
since under Pena the pasture in which to roam is even larger, and is reviewed under the "abuse of 
discretion" standard. 
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Before I leave this point, I wish to distinguish State v. Striebv, 790 P.2d 98 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990), upon which the defendant relies. The Striebv case involved a domestic violence 
confrontation between husband and wife. The facts clearly demonstrate that the husband was the 
aggressor and that he had and was making credible threats to kill his wife. During a lull in the 
fight, the husband went to the kitchen and the wife went upstairs and got a gun. The husband 
returned to the stairs and ascended the stairs again threatening to kill the wife. The wife then shot 
and killed the husband. The wife was charged with manslaughter. The trial court found that the 
lull in the fight during which the husband went to the kitchen and the wife went upstairs and got 
the gun was a sufficient break in the hostilities that the wife now became the aggressor and ruled 
that self-defense was unavailable to the wife. The appellate court ruled that the trial court's 
findings were against the clear weight of the evidence and reversed the conviction against the 
wife. 
To apply the Striebv case to the present case would be to stand the facts of the present 
case on their head. In the present case there are facts that support a finding that the defendant 
was the initial aggressor and that the injury to Cardenas was a result of the defendant's continued 
aggression. In Striebv, the trial court used the break in the conflict to reverse the roles of the 
husband and the wife. The husband had clearly been the initial aggressor and the wife was the 
victim. After the momentary break in the conflict, the trial court in Striebv found that the wife 
was now the aggressor and the husband the victim. Little wonder that the conviction was 
reversed. There was no factual basis for the trial court's finding in Striebv. In the present case 




Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff respectfully requests that the conviction of the 
defendant for Battery, in violation of § 11.08.020 of the Salt Lake City Code, be AFFIRMED. 
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